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 1. Introduction        1 
1.1 Origin of Thesis 
In 1994 the Government of Malawi established a single refugee center and required all 
refugees to live at the designated refugee center.1To the present day the Government of 
Malawi adopts an encampment policy for all refugees and asylum seekers.2. The Policy 
follows from the reservations to article 26, which Malawi made when acceding to the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ( hereinafter CSR 51). 3
In early 2006, I was requested to be part of a Task Force, which was to prepare a cabinet 
paper for the Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security, concerning the decision to 
return all refugees in urban areas to the designated areas.  
 
The core issue emerged of the legal basis for restricting the movement, choice of residence 
of refugee within Malawi and for ordering their return to the designated areas. The Refugee 
Act4 did not provide guidance. The CSR 51, in light of the reservation to article 26 raised 
other issues on the interpretation, scope, effect, legality of the reservation and the 
encampment policy. 
 
Unfortunately before the paper was completed, the Government commenced the forced 
return of all refugees to the designated areas. The development rendered the preparation of 
the paper of no significance, hence it was never completed. 
 
This motivated me to undertake an independent, holistic legal analysis of the legality of the 
reservation and the measures in international law. The aim is to use the results of the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 - Malawi- January 1996 
2 http://www.malawi.gov.mw/Povelty/Home%20Povelty.htm 
3 This has been the view of the Government , and even accepted by UNHCR Malawi field office, see Kelvin 
s. Sentala , Refugee law as provided for in national laws in Malawi and Reservations made by Malawi to the 
1951 convention, a paper presented at Malawi Law Society Workshop on International Refugee Law, 6th –7th 
November 2006, 
4 Chapter 15:04 of the Laws of Malawi 
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analysis to clarify the uncertainty and provide a grounded understanding of the effect of the 
reservation on the enjoyment of refugees of the rights in article 26 of CSR51.   
 
1.2  Background Overview  
Malawi faced the challenge of protecting large numbers of refugees, e.g. in the 1980- 90 it 
hosted over a 1 million Mozambican refugees5. To date the challenge remains of affording 
effective enjoyment of rights by refugees while accommodating the national interests, i.e. 
security, public order, job security etc. Competing priorities with existing domestic social 
problems (unemployment, lack of business opportunities) resulting in restrictions on 
refugees rights to wage earning employment, or business this forces them to be dependent 
on UNHRC handouts for survival. 
The decision to establish refugee camps for the residence of refugees further compounded 
the problem. To the present day the Government of Malawi has designated two refugee 
camps for the residence of refugee and asylum seekers. This policy does not apply to other 
migrants.  
The negative effect of the policy on the livelihood and enjoyment of the other rights by 
refugees can not be underestimated, as the free exercise of the freedom of movement and 
choice of residence is a prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of the other rights.  
1.3 Objective of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to discuss the legality in international law of the reservation 
made by Malawi to article 26 of CSR51 and the measures employed restricting the freedom 
of movement and choice of residence of refugees in Malawi.  
 
                                                 
5 Khalid Koser , “ Information and Repatriation: The Case of Mozambican Refugees in Malawi” .Journal of 
Refugee Studies Vol. 10. No. 1(1997),p4 
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First the discussion will analyze whether the formulation of the reservation complies with 
the general international rules and the provisions in CSR51 regulating legality of 
reservations. Secondly the thesis will discuss the effect of the reservation on the enjoyment 
by refugees of the rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence provided in 
art.26 of CSR51. To this end the discussion will analyze whether the application of the 
reservation through the measures restricting freedom of movement and choice of residence 
of refugees is lawful and compatible with Malawi’s obligations as a party to the 
Convention. The thesis will also discuss the possible legal consequences of the reservation 
and measures.   
1.4 Theories and Methodology 
1.4.1 Theories  
Grotius theorized international law as a system of regulating the affairs and warfare of its 
rising nation states6.There a number of theories of the juridical basis of international law7. 
For this analysis the consensual theory has been preferred.  
 
1.4.1.1 Consensual theory 
The theory postulates international law as a positivistic system of law based on the actual 
practice of states. Its binding quality flows from the consent of states.8 International law 
can not be created without the consent of the states. The consent may be given in a variety 
of ways, express in treatise or implied in custom. Therefore a treaty would only be binding 
on a state only if it deliberately and positively accepts the terms.9
Following on this theory, the thesis is argues that once Malawi expressed its consent to be 
bound by the provisions of CSR 51, the legality of it actions are determined by the 
convention and not domestic legislation. 
                                                 
6P.101, Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd,1994 
7 J. Austin’s command theory, Natural law theory and Ubi societas, ubi jus. 
8 P.15, M. Dixion, Textbook on International Law, Oxford University Press,2005 
9 Dixion, p.16 
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It is within the context of this conceptual framework that the thesis discusses the legality in 
international law of the reservation to article 26 of CSR51, the measures restricting 
freedom of movement and choice of residence within Malawi. 
 
1.4.2 Methodology 
 
In accordance with the objectives, the study utilizes the traditional legal review and 
interpretation of law on the international, regional and national levels based on materials 
and literature (books and law review articles) collected from the library, as well as 
electronic databases (UNHCR publications).  
 
The method was also preferred to the other methods because the issues raised are primarily 
legal issues requiring a review and interpretation of existing legal instruments. Therefore 
not necessary to collect and analyze qualitative or quantitative data.   
 
1.5 Legal Sources  
 
The thesis utilizes the following legal sources.  
 
1.5.1 International Instruments 
 
The thesis reviewed, interprets and applies international instruments to which Malawi is a 
party, and also other instrument for comparisons. Principally among these being the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28th July, 1951 and the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees of 31st, January, 1967. The other instruments were the 
United Nations Charter of 26th june,1945, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10th 
December,1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16th 
December,1966. 
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1.5.2 Regional Instruments 
 
Regional instruments were also consulted, principally Organization of African Unity 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspect of Refugee Problems in Africa of  10th 
September,1969 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 27th June,1981. 
 
1.5.3 National Legislation 
 
The thesis also analyzes national legislation from Malawi.  The Constitution, Refuge Act10, 
Penal Code11 and Immigration Act12 were the primary sources. 
 
  1.5.4 Cases 
Court decisions from International Tribunal, Regional tribunal and the national courts in 
Malawi were used in the analysis of the issues.  
  
1.6 Demarcation and Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter four, five and six are the principle chapters 
as they contain my discussion of the issues underling the thesis. 
 
Chapter 1 contains the introductory part of the thesis. Chapter 2, discusses the general rules 
regulating the implementation of international law into domestic legal system, the principle 
of good faith and the implementation of CSR 51 in Malawi.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the scope of the freedom of movement and choice of residence in 
art.26 CSR51 from a general human rights law perspective, the international refugee law 
context and Malawi refugee law. 
 
                                                 
10 Chapter 15:04 of the Laws of Malawi 
11 Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
12 Chapter 15:03 of the Laws of Malawi 
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Chapter 4 analyses the legality in international law of Malawi’s reservation to art.26 of 
CSR51 in the context of the theory, practice of reservations and relevant provisions of the 
CSR51. Chapter 5 considers the legality of the measures restricting the freedom of 
movement and choice of residence of refugees.  
 
Chapter 6 contains the discussion of the legal consequences for Malawi of its reservation 
and restrictions in light of their legality in international law.Chapter 7 is the conclusion.  
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 2   Implementation And Observance Of CSR51 In Malawi  
   
2.1 The Implementation of Treaties  
 
For the provisions of CSR51 to be applicable within Malawi it will depend on whether it 
forms part of the domestic law. This will dependent on the theory and means of 
implementation of international law followed in Malawi.  
 
2.1.1 Theories of Implementation 
  
There three theories13 that explain the relationship between international and national law, 
namely monism14, dualism15 and monistic conception.16  
 
Malawi appears adheres to the dualist theory17. The first Constitution18 did not explicitly 
make provisions for the implementation of international law. The Supreme Court in 
Chakufwa Tom Chihana V Republic19, pointed out the requirement of an Act of Parliament 
to incorporate the provisions of the international treaty into Malawi law for it to be 
applicable. This meant that international law was not part of the law of Malawi unless 
specifically implemented by an Act of Parliament.   
 
                                                 
13 Cassese ,Antonio, International Law ,  Oxford University Press, 2005,p213 
14Monism supposes that international law and national law are part of one coherent legal system, operating in 
the same arena and concerned with the same subject matter, with international law attaining superiority over 
national law in cases of conflict between the two.  See M. Dixon p 83, Cf Cassese p214  who suggest the 
superiority of national over international law 
 
15Dualism perceive national law and international law as separate systems of law, differing as to their 
subjects, sources and content. See, Cassese p214 
16Presupposes the existence of a single legal system with the various legal orders operating at different levels 
but with same subjects. International law supreme over national law. Cassese calls it monistic conception.  
17 Hansen, Thomas Trier, Implementation of International Human Rights standards Through The Courts in 
Malawi, Journal of African Law, 46,1(200), p.31 
18 Come into force on independence from Britain on 6th July 1966.  
19 MSCA Criminal Appeal no. 9 of 1993, www.saflii.org/mw/cases/MWSC/1993/1.html 
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In 1994 a new Constitution came into force which ushered in a Democratic State from a 
one party state. The Constitution in s.21120(1) provided that international agreements 
entered into need to be ratified by an Act of Parliament and the Act should also provide 
that the agreement forms part of the law of Malawi. In respect of agreements entered into 
before the entry into force of the 1994 Constitution S. 211(2) and binding on the Republic 
they form part of the law, unless Parliament subsequently provides otherwise or the 
agreement otherwise lapses. Under s.211(3), Customary international law forms part of the 
law of Malawi unless inconsistent with the constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
 
These provision means that international law and national law belong to different legal 
systems, hence a dualist approach obtains in Malawi. This implies that for the CSR 51to be 
applicable, had to be implemented into the domestic law by an Act of Parliament.   
 
2.2 Implementation of  CSR 51 in Malawi 
 
Depending on which theory forms the basis of the constitutional rules regulating the 
relationship of national law and international law there will still be the need to translate 
international legal obligations into national legal system. 
 
In most states have own choice of procedures for giving effect to international obligations 
within national legal systems.21There two modes (doctrines) for the implementation of 
international law in the domestic systems, namely transformation22 and incorporation.  
The doctrine of incorporation means that international rules become part of the national 
law without the requirement of their being formally adopted by legislative Act or judicial 
                                                 
20S.211 (1) Any international agreement ratified by an Act of Parliament shall form part of the law of the 
Republic if so provided for in the Act of Parliament ratifying the agreement,(2) International agreements 
entered into before the commencement of this Constitution and binding on the Republic shall form part of the 
law of the Republic, unless Parliament subsequently provides otherwise or the agreement otherwise lapses,(3) 
Customary international law, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, shall have 
continued application. 
21 Quoted by A.P. Fachi, The local remedies in the light of Finnish Ships Arbitration, 17 BYIL(1936)p 23-4 
22 Martin Dixon, Malcolm Shaw, and Ian Brownlie call it transformation while Cassese calls it legislative ad 
hoc or automatic ad hoc incorporation. For the purposes of this discussion transformation is preferred.  
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decision. In some states this may only apply to customary international law and not to 
treaties,23as long as not inconsistent with Acts of Parliament or prior Judicial decisions.24
  
Under the transformation doctrine international rules become applicable in the domestic 
legal system through specific domestic legislation .This may be through a domestic statute 
referring to the Treaty as part of the law of the state without reformulating its provisions, 
with the treaty itself annexed. Alternatively the legislative Act may translate the specific 
provisions of the treaty into a domestic Act without annexing the treaty. 
 
Malawi is a party to CSR 51, 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
Organization of African Union25 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa of 1969(hereinafter referred to as the OAUR 69)26. Malawi acceded to 
the 1951 Convention and the Protocol on 10th December, 1987. It acceded to the OAUR 
69 on 4th November, 1987. 
 
On 26th April, 1989 Malawi enacted the Refugee Act.27The Act in s.2 on interpretations 
defines the word ”refugee conventions” to mean the CSR51, 1967 Protocol and the OAUR 
69. The same section defines a refugee in (a) using the same wording of the CSR51 as 
amended by the 1967 Protocol and in (b) incorporates art. 2 of  OAUR69.28
 
S.8 on grounds for exclusion from refugee status, combines the provisions of art.1 (F) of 
CSR51 Convention and art.5 of OAUR69.S.10 (1) (a), (b) (C) and (6) reformulates the 
                                                 
23 In McLain Watson v Department of Trade and Industry, Lord Oliver noted, ”Quite simply, a treaty is no 
part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the law by legislation.”1989] AllER 523,531 
24 In Britain, see Brownlie, p 41. In Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria, Shaw LJ noted 
that;”the English Courts must at any given time discover what the prevailing international rule is and apply 
that rule” 
25 Now African Union 
26 CSR51 entered into force on 22nd April, 1954, the Protocol on 4th October, 1967. OAUR69 on 20th June, 
1974. 
27 Chapter 15:04 of the Laws of Malawi 
28 Maluwa,Tiyanjana, The Domestic Implementation of International Refugee Law: a Brief Note on Malawis 
Refugee Act, IJRL Vol.3 No.3 (1991), p503 
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provisions of articles 32, 33 of CSR51and art.2(3) of the OAUR69. S.10 (4) on treatment 
of refugees illegally within Malawi transforms art.31 of the CSR51. 
 
Cessation of refugee status is considered in s. 12 which outlines similar as art.1 (C) of the 
CSR51and art.1 (a) (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the OAUR69.  The proviso to s.10 cover those 
refugee who are able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for 
refusing to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality or return to the 
country of former habitual residence, provide in the proviso to art. 1 (c)(5) of the CSR5. 
 
It can be concluded that Malawi implemented the Refugee Convention by transformation 
of the Conventions through a legislative Act, translating the provisions of the treaties by 
setting out in detail the various obligations and rights into a domestic Act. Therefore the 
Convention rules have a status of an Act of Parliament subordinate only to the 
Constitution. 
 
2.3 Pacta Sunt Servanda 
 
The implementation of CSR 51 into the national law is one part in Malawi’s duty to 
comply with its international obligations under the convention. The other part comprises 
the obligation to perform the convention in good faith,  pacta sunt servanda.   
 
The principle places an obligation on state parties to treatise whether bilateral or 
multilateral to perform or carry out the obligations under them in good faith. This principle 
is the basis of law of treaties since the whole concept of binding international agreements is 
founded on the presupposition that such instruments are commonly accepted as possessing 
that quality29. The ICJ stated in Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France,30
 
                                                 
29 Shaw, p 81 
30 ICJ Reports, 1974, pp.253, 268 
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“One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, 
whatever their source, is the principle of good faith… Just as very rule of pacta sunt 
servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of 
international obligations assumed by unilateral obligation.” 
 
The United Nations Charter enshrines this principle in art.2 (2),31 supplemented by the 
General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV)32, which elaborates the principle33 and extends 
the duty to obligations under generally recognized principles of international law. This 
would include the obligations under the CSR51. The principle exists at custom and as well 
as part of treaty law in art 26 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.34.The 
principle does not create new obligations but shapes the observance of existing rules of 
international law and constrains the manner in which those rules may legitimately be 
exercised.35  
 
Therefore Malawi as a state party has an obligation to implement and perform the 
obligations under the CSR 51 in good faith.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 “ All members , in order to ensure  to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall 
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” 
 
32 1970 Declaration on Principles Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
33 ” Every state has a duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and 
rules of international law. Every state has a duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under international 
agreements valid under the general recognized principles and rules of international law...”  
34 “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” 
35 Shaw, p82 
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3    Scope Of Freedom Of Movement And Choice Of Residence In Art 26 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Article 26 of CSR 51 (the subject of Malawi reservation) guarantees freedom of movement 
and choice of residence for refugees. In order to fully analyze the legality of the reservation 
and the measures it is imperative to understand the scope of freedom of movement and 
choice of residence guaranteed. This being a general human right will consider freedom of 
movement and choice of residence from a general human rights perspective, refugee law 
and finally in the context of Malawi. 
 
3.2 Under Human Rights Law 
 
The discussion will start with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1949(hereinafter UDHR), the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights 
(hereinafter ICCPR).On a Regional level will only focus on the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples Rights since Malawi is an African country and a party to it. 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The UDHR art. 13(1) guarantees everyone the freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each state. The provision outlines two rights,36 the right to freedom of 
movement (freedom of internal movement) and the freedom of residence (freedom of 
residence).  
 
                                                 
36 Commentary by Grahl-Madsen, Melander and Ring, in  Alfredsson, G and Eide, A (eds), The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Kluwer International, 1999, pp.265 
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Freedom of internal movement means everyone within the state may move freely within 
that state, without let, hindrance and without having to ask the permission of the authorities 
or to justify his/her presence in any particular place.37
 
In terms of freedom of residence art. 13(1) means that everyone, within the territory of the 
state may choose where to live whether in a city or village or country side. May also 
choose which place, town, village or country side he/she will make the center of their life. 
This can be decided without asking for special permit from the authorities38.  
 
The use of the word “everyone” signifies the availability of the right to citizens and aliens. 
Art. 26 read in the context of art.14 (1)39 extends the freedoms also to refugees. Art.13 (1) 
does not restrict the freedom to only those lawfully within the territory, but guarantees to 
everyone within the state territory. This means that every person within the territory of the 
state whether lawfully or unlawfully present enjoys the right. Though in practice state 
decides only guarantee this right to those lawfully present. 
  
The enjoyment of the rights in art.13 (1) is subject to the limitations placed by art.29.40 The 
limitations should be determined by law for securing recognition, respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others, meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and general 
welfare in a democratic society. The article prohibits the exercise of the rights contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.  
 
Following the UDHR a number of international and regional Human Rights Instruments41 
have also made provision for the rights. 
                                                 
37 See note 37 above 
38 Commentary by Grahl-Madsen, Melander and Ring, in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds), The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,,pp.272 
39 on the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
40 Provides for duties to one community. Also limit’s the rights to due to securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others, requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society and to act contrary to the purposes and principles of the United nations   
41 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 art.2 (1) of 
the 4th Protocol and the American Convention on Human Rights in art.22 (1 
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3.2.2  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
The ICCPR42, in art.12 (1) makes provisions for right to liberty of internal movement and 
freedom of choice of residence. 
 
In terms of liberty of movement the provision means a person lawfully within the territory 
of the state has the liberty to move unhindered throughout the territory of the state without 
depending on any particular purpose or reason for the person wanting to move43.For choice 
of residence the provision means that everyone lawfully within the territory of the state has 
the freedom to set up permanently or temporarily residence at any location within the states 
party’s territory.44  
 
The enjoyment of the rights in this art is restricted to persons lawfully within the territory 
of a state as opposed to art.13 (1) of the UDHR. The lawfulness will be determined by each 
national legal system45.The article does not create a right of entry for aliens as their entry is 
also subject to the law of each state.46
 
The covenant does not make provide for the right to seek and enjoy asylum. It is submitted 
the use of the words “everyone” means the rights are guaranteed to citizens, aliens and 
including refugees as long as lawfully within the territory. 
 
Art. 12(3) limits the enjoyment of the right by allowing restrictions that are,  provided by 
law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others, and consistent with the other rights recognized in the 
covenant. In Ackla v Togo47 the Human Rights Committee stated that failure by the state to 
                                                 
42 Entered into force on 23rd March 1976 
43 General Comment 15/27 
44 General Comment 15/27 
45 Nowak, Manfred, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, N.P.Engel, Publishers, 
2005  p.262 
46 Nowak,p.263  
47 Human Rights Committee,(505/92) 
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give any explanation justify its restrictions on an individual to enter his home district and 
village, pursuant to art.12 (3) will result in a violation of art.12 (1).In Karker v France48 
The Committee held measures restricting the choice of residence of a refugee to be 
necessary in the interest of national security, where he was a member of a group which 
supported violent action. In Mpandanjila v Zaire49The Committee held administrative 
measures banning ex-parliamentarian (who were critical to the government) and their 
families to forced relocated regions of the country a violation of art.12. In Mpaka-Nsusu v 
Zaire50 The Committee found the banishment of a presidential candidate to his village of 
origin to be a violation of art.12.51
 
Theses cases show that the enjoyment of rights can only be limited on grounds specified in 
art.12(3). Whether a states limitation is justified will depend on the reasons and manner of 
implementing the restrictions. Where no reasons are provide or where the reasons provided 
are not among the permissible ones the state will be in violation of art.12. The cases also 
show that the burden rests with the state to show that the limitations are compatible with 
the provision. In Ackla v Togo, Mpandanjila v Zaire and  Mpaka-Nsusu v Zaire the state 
failed to give reasons justifying the restriction in line with the convention and the measures 
were held to have violated art.12. While the Committee found the measures in Karker v 
France as justified limitations of the basis of national security. 
 
Under the ICCPR the fact that internal law legalizes the limitation appears does to be 
relevant, but rather consistency of the limitation with art.12. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Human Rights Committee,(833/98) 
49 183/1983 
50 157/1983 
51 See also, Bailliet, Cecelia, Between Conflict & Consensus: Conciliating Land Disputes in Guatemala 
,Institute of Public & International Law, University of Oslo,2002, p.159  
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3.2.3 African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)52
 
The African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights in article 12. Art. 12(1) guarantees 
every individual the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a 
State party provided they abide by the law. The requirement for the individual to abide by 
implies that the entry and presence of the individual into that territory should be in 
accordance with the domestic law53.  
 
Art 12 (3) provides every individual the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum 
in other countries in accordance with laws of those countries and international conventions. 
Article 2 guarantees every individual the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized 
and guaranteed in the Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status among others. Refugee being a 
status would be within article 2, therefore a refugee within the territory of a member state 
would also enjoy the freedom of movement and choice of residence. 
 
The exercise of the rights appears to be limited by the requirement that the person abides 
by the law. This broad limitation may open the door to unwarranted limitation and 
restrictions.54
 
3.3 Under Refugee Law 
 
General international human rights law establishes the minimum core content of human 
rights applicable to every one regardless of their status or any other pre-requisite. Refugee 
                                                 
52 Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 
1986: 
53 Ouguergouz, Fatsah, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa,  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2003, p 122  
54 F. Ouguergouz, p.123 
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law is a specialized branch of human rights law that seeks to protect the rights of persons 
that are outside their country of origin due to a well founded fear of persecution55. 
 
3.3.1 Under  CSR 51 
 
 The CSR 51 is the specific international instrument regarding the rights of refugees (also 
called an extraordinary Bill of Rights of refugees56), though international human rights law 
still offers an increasingly important complement to the Convention57.  
 
The CSR 51 in art. 26 provides58,  
 
“Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their 
place of residence and to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to 
aliens generally in the same circumstances.” 
 
The words “shall accord” imply that art. 26 impose a mandatory obligation, not a mere 
recommendation.59The obligation is subject “to any regulations applicable to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances”, this prohibits a state from passing special regulations 
restricting these freedoms for refugees which does not apply also to aliens. 
 
Article 26 applies only to “refugees lawfully in (the) territory”. There appears to be no 
single precise meaning of “lawfully in the territory”. The Court of Appeal in England in 
Kaya v Haringey London Borough Council said; 
“There is no settled international meaning of the term” lawfully” not merely in international but 
national law. The word …can mean a wide range of things in different contexts…the most obvious 
                                                 
55 McAdam, Jane (2006) The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of international 
protection, (online) New Issues In Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 125,UNHCR,www.unhcr.org 
56 Gorlick, Brian, Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection Through International Human Rights 
Law, 2000, Nordic Journal Of International Law69:p117, p122 
57 Edwards, Alice, Human Rights, Refugees, and The Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asylum, IJRL 2005, vol 17,no.2p.293, 
p296. see  Da Costa, Rosa (2006) , Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and 
Recommendations, (online) Legal And Protection Policy Research Series ,UNHCR,www.unhcr.org 
58 Art.2 of the 1938 Convention on the Status of Refuges Coming From Germany, is similar to this provision 
59 Commentary On The Refugee Convention,1951,Articles 2-11, 13-37, Grahl-Madsen,p.63 
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explanation…is that the contracting parties to the Convention wished to reserve to themselves the 
right to determine conditions of entry, at least in cases not covered by the Refugee Convention.” 60   
 
The explanation proffered appears sound and in conformity with similar provisions in the 
international human rights instruments. From the wording of the article the determination 
of lawful presence within a state territory was to be determined by it national law, only 
constrained by the impermissibility of deeming presence to be unlawful in circumstances 
where the convention deems it lawful.61 Reading it with art. 31(2) the rights apply after 
regularization of status to an asylum seeker who entered or was present without 
authorization62. 
 
In terms of freedom of movement the article means that a refugee is free within the 
territory of the state, to move for whatever reasons without seeking permission from the 
authorities of the state. This may only be restricted by those regulations that apply to aliens 
generally. The right is applicable only within the territory of the State concerned and does 
not include the right to enter, leave or re-enter the national territory. 
 
For choice of residence it implies the right of a refugee to decide where to establish his/her 
residence freely without being confined to specific regions or designated areas within the 
state. It should be noted that art. 21 CSR 51 provides where housing is regulated by laws or 
regulations or subject to the control of public authorities, refugees lawfully in the territory 
are to be granted treatment as favourable as possible, and at least as favourable as granted 
to aliens generally in the same circumstances.The right to elect one’s place of residence 
also implies the right to continue living in that place63. 
 
                                                 
60 [2001]EWCA Civ 677,para.31 
61 Hathaway, James The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press,2005 
62 Field, Ophelia nd Edwards, Alice, (2006) Alternatives To Detention Of Asylum Seekers And Refugees 
(online) Legal And Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCR, www.unhcr.org 
 
63 Rosa da Costa,,p.157 
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Article 9 of the CSR51 Convention allows States to derogate from their obligations in 
article 26 in certain situations, such as in time of war or other grave exceptional 
circumstances. However, such derogations are subject to certain conditions, i.e. they must 
be against a particular person (rather than a group or category of persons), of a provisional 
nature, and in the case of an already recognized refugee, the State must show that the 
continuation of these provisional measures in that particular instance is necessary in the 
interests of national security. 
 
 The use of the phrase “in the case of a particular person”, shows that the meaning of this 
provision is to restrict the applicability of provisional measures to individual persons, and 
not groups of refugees. 
 
Article 8 of the CSR51 aims at exempting refugees who formally possess the nationality of 
the country which they have fled from being subjected to exceptional measures which are 
otherwise imposed on nationals of that country during times of war or international tension 
e.g. restrictions on freedom of movement, prohibition of entry and rejection at border. This 
provision guarantees the continued enjoyment of the freedom by refugees even if the same 
has been curtailed for other foreigners. 
 
The following African countries64 have made reservations to this provision, Angola, 
Botswana, Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda including Malawi. Thought it should be pointed 
out that countries from other continents have also maintained reservation to it. 
 
 3.3.2 Under OAUR 69 
 
At the African regional level the OAUR69, regulates all matters relating to refugees. 
Surprisingly no provision specifically provides for the freedom of movement and choice of 
residence, even though this is one of the most important rights to a refugee.  
                                                 
64 Declarations and Reservations to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees As of 1 March 
2006 
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 The provisions in art.12 (1) and (3) the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights 
(ACHPR)65 remain the only relevant ones.  
In terms of limitations on the freedom, art.6 of the OAUR69 obliges states for reasons of 
security to as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of 
their country of origin66. This places a justifiable restriction on the choice of residence of 
refugees for reasons of security. 
3.4 Freedom of Movement and Choice of Residence in Malawi. 
 
The overall law governing residence of persons in Malawi is the Constitution67, which in s. 
39 guarantees that everyone shall have the right of freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of Malawi. S. 20 prohibits discrimination on the basis among other of 
“other status.” It is submitted this include refugees in the enjoyment of the right. S.44(2) 
permits the restrictions or limitation on the freedom in s.39 provided they are prescribed by 
law, are reasonable, recognized by international human rights standards and necessary in an 
open and democratic society.  
For matters specifically concerning refugees are regulated by the Refugee Act68, which 
incorporates the CSR51, 1967 Protocol and OAUR69. The Act does not specifically have a 
specific provision regulating movement and residence of refugees.S.13 (b) (VI) empowers 
the minister to make regulations for the carrying out of or giving effect to the provisions of 
the Act which may make provision for the traveling or movement of refugees within and 
outside Malawi. The Subsidiary Legislation (Refugee Regulations)69 made pursuant to s.13 
do not contain any provision restricting or limiting the movement or residence of refugees.  
                                                 
65 See p.29 above 
66 Similar provisions are found in Latin America asylum conventions: Havana convention, art.2(4); Caracas 
convention on Territorial asylum, art.9  
67 Chapter 1:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
68 Cap 15:04 of the Laws of Malawi. 
69 General Notice.51/1991 
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Malawi made a reservation to art.26 of CSR51 on the freedom of movement and choice of 
residence, pursuant to which the internal movement and choice of residence of refugees has 
been curtailed through the encampment policy.70This has led to the restriction of the choice 
of residence of refugee to refugee camps and movement of is subject to prior permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 http://www.malawi.gov.mw/Povelty/Home%20Povelty.htm 
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 4 Whether The Reservations Is Lawful  ? 
 
4.1   Theory and Practice of Reservations71 
 
Prior to the League of Nations the established customary international rule required a 
reservation to a multilateral convention to be accepted by all the signatory states.72 The ICJ 
advisory opinion in the Reservations to the Convention on the Punishment of Genocide73  
modified the rule so that a state party which had made and maintained a reservation which 
was objected to by one or more of the parties to the convention but not by others, to be 
regarded as being a party to the convention if the reservation was compatible with the 
object and purpose of the convention otherwise, that state could not be regarded as being a 
party. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties74 codified existing customary rules as well 
as formulated new rules regulating the admissibility and effect of reservations. Article 19 
makes the admissibility of a reservation based on whether it’s prohibited by the treaty or 
not. For treaties without provisions prohibiting reservations or only allowing reservations 
to specified provisions, it depends on the compatibility with the object and purpose of the 
treaty.75
 
In art. 21 the effect of objecting or accepting a reservation in practical terms still modifies 
the application of the treaty to the extent of the reservation, unless the objecting state 
                                                 
71 A reservation has been defined in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.2, as “…a unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that state 
72 Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 RECUEL Des COURS 95,112 (1975) 
73 ICJ Reports, 1951,pp15 
74 Of 22nd May, 1969, entered in force on 27th January, 1980 
75 The legal effect of reservations is regulated by art.20-21. The Unanimity rule has been retained in art. 20 
(2) . 
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opposes the entry into force.76Each state party has the discretion to determine whether a 
reservation fulfils the criteria and whether to object or not. Under most treaties no 
independent or objective treaty body has the mandate to determine the admissibility of 
reservations.  
 
This may have adverse implications in the implementation of treaties that aim at protecting 
individual rights like the ICCPR and CSR 51, since the decision of a state to object or not 
may not necessary be because the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the treaty but rather on other self interest considerations or political reasons. Partly due 
to this fear the European Court of Human Rights77 and the UN Human Rights Committee78 
consider that if a state enters a reservation to a human rights treaty that is inadmissible 
because it is not allowed by the treaty or because it is contrary to the object and purpose of 
the treaty, that reservation must be regarded as null and void. This practice also considers 
invalid reservations as being severable with the effect that the treaty would apply in full 
between the reserving state and the other state79. 
 
In contrast the CSR51 does not provide for refugees the procedural right to petition 
International Tribunals to enforce their rights. This would not preclude refugee petitions to 
                                                 
76In the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case76 arbitral tribunal noted that the combined effect of the French 
reservations and their rejection by the United Kingdom did not render art. 6[ Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, 1958] inapplicable, only inapplicable to the extent of the reservations.” 
Cmnd.7438(1979),p. 45; 54 ILR, p.52 
77 The European Court of Human Rights, in the Belilos case( Series A,No132)considered  an interpretative 
declaration of Switzerland to art.6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had the  effect of  a 
reservation. It held it invalid with the effect that Switzerland was bound by art.6 in full. In Loizidou 
(preliminary objections) case(Series A,No.310)the Court held reservations made by Turkey as being 
impermissible under the European Convention on Human Rights. The effect was that Turkeys’ acceptance of 
the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Court remained unrestricted by the terms of the limitations. 
78 24/52 of 2 November 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 The Committee reasoned that the special nature of 
human rights treaties which are not just a web of interstate exchange of mutual obligations but concern the 
endowment of individual rights. That states have not often seen the need to object, hence the absence of 
objections does not imply that the reservation is compatible or not with the object and purpose of the 
convention.  
79 Goodman,Ryan, Human Rights Treatise, Invalid Reservations and State Consent, 96 AJIL 531(2002), 
Baratta, Robert, Should Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treatise be Disregarded? 11 EUR.INT.L 413 
(2000) 
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International Human rights tribunals under the human rights instruments80. It remains to be 
seen whether the tribunals would make similar pronouncements on the severability of 
reservations to CSR51. 
 
4.2 Reservations under CSR 51 
 
The CSR 51 regulates the formulation of reservations through article 42; 
 
“1.  At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to 
articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1),33, 36-46 inclusive. 
 
2.  Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may at any 
time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.” 
 
The Convention prohibits reservations to articles specified in art.42 (1) and permits to all 
the others. Any reservations to the prohibited articles would be inadmissible under the 
Convention. States may make reservations to the other articles do not require acceptance by 
other state for them to take effect. Additionally even where a treaty expressly permits 
reservations, any such reservation must be compatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty.81.This prohibits a state making a reservation to a permissible provision, but whose 
effect may be incompatible with its object and purpose.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Persuad, Santhash (2006) Protecting Refugees and Asylum Seekers under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (online) New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR,www.unhcr.org  
81 Blay, Samuel K.N.  and Tsamenyi, B.Martin, Reservations and Declarations Under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee. International Journal of Refugee Law Vol.2 No.2 
(1990), 531 
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4.3 Malawi’s Reservations to CSR51 
 
Malawi made reservations to articles7,13,15,17,19,22,24,26 and 34 of CSR 5182. For this 
discussion, the focus will be on the legality of reservation to art 26; 
 
     “ In respect of article 26 
The Government of the Republic of Malawi reserves its right to designate the place or places of 
residence of the refugees and to restrict their movements whenever considerations of national 
security or public order so require83.” 
It did not make any reservations to the 1967 Protocol only made a declaration84. 
 
4.4    Legality of Reservation to Article 26 
 
The legality of a reservation by a state party to CSR51 depends on whether it satisfies the 
requirements of arti.42, and consistent with the object and purpose of the convention. 
Under this provision the reservation should ; 
 
(i) be made at signature, ratification or accession, 
(ii) not be to the provisions specified in art. 42(1), 
(iii) consistent with object and purpose of CSR51 
 
It should be noted that the provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may 
not apply to the CSR51  by operation of art. 4 since the it was concluded before the entry 
into force of the Vienna Convention. The rules contained in the Vienna Convention to the 
extent that they reflect customary international law, may still be applicable to the CSR 51 
independent of the Vienna Convention. It is noted that the rules in art.19 as shown in 
chapter two above are a reflection of existing customary law.  
 
                                                 
82 Declarations and Reservations to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees As of 1 March 
2006 
83 Note 82, 
84 Note 82, 
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 4.4.1 At signature, ratification or accession, 
 
Malawi made acceded to the CSR 51 and the 1967 Protocol on 10th December 198785. In 
its accession instrument it appended reservation to mentioned articles including article 26 
of CSR51. Since the reservations were made at accession it meets the requirement of (i). 
 
  4.4.2 Not prohibited by art.42 (1) 
 
 Article 26 is not among the articles to which reservations are expressly prohibited under 
art. 42. The reservation therefore satisfies the second requirement of not being made to an 
article which is among those to which reservations are expressly prohibited by art.42 of the 
Convention. 
   
4.3.3    Consistency with object and purpose  
 
In discussing the consistency of the reservation, will first outline the object and purpose of 
CSR 51. Then will discuss the scope and effect of the reservation in light of the object and 
purpose of CSR51.  
4.3.3.1 object and purpose 
 
The object and purposes of CSR 51 are outline in the preamble. These include to safeguard 
and assure refugees the widest possible exercise of the fundamental human rights. To 
revise and consolidate earlier international agreements and extend the scope and protection 
accorded by them.86 The fundamental rights and freedoms include those in the field of non-
refoulment, residence and freedom of movement87.  
 
 
 
                                                 
85 http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf 
86See also,  Blay and Tsamenyi, p.532 
87 Blay and Tsamenyi, p.532 
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4.3.3.2     Scope and Effect 
 
A reservation can have the legal effect of excluding, modifying or even extending the 
obligation of a state party to a treaty provision88. 
 
A reservation has excluding effect where it denies the active duty (an obligation to do 
something) created or imposed by a treaty-based norm89.The reserving state party will be 
free from perform the duty. 
 
A reservation has modifying effect where it does not deny or dissolve the obligation 
expressed in the treaty provision, but permits it to prevail under a modified form. This may 
be through altering the content by limiting the scope of obligations, to cover only part of 
the original state of affairs (quantitative modifying reservation) or altering the contents of 
the norm by replacing the original state of affairs with a completely distinct state of affairs 
(qualitative modifying reservation).90  
 
A reserving state may also commit itself to obligations not required by the treaty or to 
obligations that go beyond those which the treaty stipulates (extensive or commissive 
reservations).91
 
The reservations made by Malawi can be classified into excluding and modifying 
reservations. Excluding reservations would include those made to articles 7, 13, 15, 19, 22 
and 24 which the Government considered as recommendations and not legally binding 
obligations. The list would also include reservations to articles 17 and 34 which it 
considered itself not bound by. 
 
                                                 
88 Frank Horn,Reservations and Interpretive Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, Swedish Institute of 
International Law,1988 p80 
89 Horn, p.83 
90 Horn,p.81 
91 Horn,p89-90 
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For reservation to art.26 on the face of it appears to support the view obtaining prevailing 
legal view in Malawi that it excludes the duty of the Government to perform the obligation 
stipulated92.Interpreting the provision in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose93 
may provide a different meaning. 
 
The ordinary meaning of to “reserve the right to do something” is to formally keep until 
later (or until when necessary)the right to do something94The word right appears to have 
been used in the ordinary meaning of having a legal or moral authority to do something95 
than in the sense of entitlements in Human Rights law sense.  
 
The word “whenever” means at any time or in any situation when something may be 
wanted, needed, possible or necessary96.The word “consideration” appear to have been 
used in the ordinary meaning of careful though before making a decision or judgment about 
something97 or to think about a particular fact or detail and allow it to have some influence 
when making a decision. The word "require" ordinarily mean need, or necessitate. 
 
Apply in good faith the ordinary meaning of the terms used in their context and in the light 
of the object and purpose of the provision the reservation to art. 26 means; the Government 
of Malawi formally kept till later or until when it thinks necessary, its legal authority to 
designate place or places of residence of refugees and restrict their movement at any time 
or in any situation when careful thought or decision or judgment of national security or 
public order need or necessitate. 
 
This means that the reservation only modified and did not exclude the application of the 
provision. It did not deny or dissolve the obligation expressed in art.26, but permitted it to 
                                                 
92 K. Sentala , See note 3 above 
93 Art.31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is also a customary principle of interpretation. 
94 Macmillan English Dictionary For Advanced Learners,2006 Edition,p.1204 
95 Macmillan English Dictionary,p.1222 
96 Macmillan English Dictionary, p.1632 
97 Macmillan English Dictionary,p.295 
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prevail in a modified form. Therefore Malawi has a duty to fulfill the obligation but in the 
form modified by its reservation. This implies that refugees lawfully within Malawi have 
the freedom of internal movement and choice of residence subject to the modifications 
made by the reservation. 
 
Therefore the enjoyment of the right to freedom of internal movement and choice of 
residence of refugees lawfully within Malawi can only be limited the consideration of 
national security and public order. Therefore where national security or public order does 
not require, then the Government can not validly restrict the choice of residence and 
movement of refugees lawfully within Malawi. 
 
The meaning of “lawfully within” is subject to the national legislation regulating the entry 
and exit of persons.98In Malawi the Immigration Act99 regulates the entry, residence and 
exit of person. In s.13 places an obligation on persons entering to immediately present 
themselves to the nearest immigration officer or if impracticable to do so within 24 hours. 
Failure to do so may lender the person illegal within Malawi. Under s.21 a person cannot 
be lawfully within Malawi unless in possession of visitors or any residence permit. 
 
For refugees and asylum seeker the application of the provision is modified by the 
provision of the Refugee Act.100Under s.10(4) any person who illegally enters Malawi as 
an asylum seeker should present himself within 20 hours of his entry before a competent 
officer but should not be detained, imprisoned, declared a prohibited immigrant or 
otherwise penalized. For asylum seekers that have complied with s.10(4) would be lawfully 
within Malawi, for those that have not would be illegally within Malawi though this itself 
may not prevent the determination of their application nor lender then subject to 
persecution101 or refoulment102. For those whose status has been recognized by the 
                                                 
98 See chapter three above 
99 Chapter 15:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
100 Chapter 15:04 of the Laws of Malawi 
101 S.10(4) of Refugee Act 
102 Article 33 CSR51 Convention 
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Refugee Committee under s.6 of the Act they are lawful within Malawi. Hence these 
qualify to enjoy the rights in art.26 of CSR51.     
 
Therefore the reservation is consistent with the object and purpose of the convention since 
it does not exclude the exercise of the rights, only limits the exercise to situations where the 
considerations of national security or public order. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Therefore the reservation complies with the rules regulating the formulation of reservations 
and consistent with the object and purpose of under CSR51.The other state parties did not 
object to the reservation103.Therefore it is submitted that the reservation made by Malawi 
to art. 26 of CSR 51 is lawful in international law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Declarations and Reservations to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees As of 1 March 
2006 
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 5 Whether The Measures Are Lawful?     
 
5.1 Legality of the Measures 
 
The legality of the measures restricting freedom of movement and choice of residence of 
refugee in Malawi will depend on whether the measures comply with the provisions of 
article 26 CSR51 as modified by the reservation. 
 
In order to comply with article 26 as modified by the reservation the measures have to meet 
the following conditions104; 
(i) should be required 
(ii) by national security or, 
(iii) public order. 
 
5.1.1  Should be required 
 
The reservations to article 26 preconditions the designation of places of residence and 
restriction on movement on whenever the consideration of national security and public 
order so require. This implies that the measures and restrictions would only be 
implemented when required. In each situation the government will make a decision having 
considered the situation and the requirement of national security. This may result in 
imposition of only restrictions on freedom of movement of all or only a select number of 
refugee depending on what would be considered the requirement of national security or 
public order.  
 
The duration of the restrictions would also then depend on a requirement of national 
security or public order. When the purpose has been achieved the measures would have to 
                                                 
104 Refer to discussion on the scope of the reservation and art.26,  5.1 above 
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cease unless still required. It is argued that this means that the measures or restrictions 
would have to relate or be proportional to the requirement.  
 
Whether the restrictions and designation of residence is lawful will depend on the 
perceived requirement of the consideration of national security and public order.  
 
5.1.2 National Security 
 
The CSR51 and the 1967 Protocol have not defined national security. In order to establish a 
general understanding of the term in the context of refugee law we will discuss cases and 
literature interpreting discussing the concept and will apply that to the present case. 
 
Grahl-Madsen considered the term threat to national security to include, 
 
“If a refugee is spying against his country of residence, he is threatening the national security of that 
country…The same applies if he is engaged in activities directed at the overthrow by force or other 
illegal means of the government of his country of residence, or in activities which are directed 
against a foreign government, which as a result threatens the government of the country of residence 
with intervention of a serious nature”105
 
Grahl-Madsen formulation focuses on the subversive activities of the refugee which have a 
direct impact on the host country. Accordingly activities which do not have the same 
impact would not amount to a threat to national security.   
 
In the United Kingdom the House of Lords in Secretary of State for Home Department v 
Rehman106 was of the opinion that requirement to show direct impact on host state limits 
the discretion of the executive in deciding how the interest of the state need to be protected. 
It was of the view that what is required is a real possibility of an adverse effect on the host 
state by the activities of the refugee. The UK is therefore not obliged to harbor a person 
                                                 
105A. Grahl-Madsen, “Expulsion of Refugees,” in P. Macalister-smith and G. Alfredsson eds, p8   
106 [2001] UKHL 47 
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who is taking actions against another state, if that other state could realistically be seen by 
the executive as likely to take action against the UK.   
 
In Canada the Supreme Court in Suresh v Canada107 stated; 
 
“A person constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or she poses a serious threat to the 
security of Canada, whether direct or indirect and bearing in mind the fact that the security of one 
country is often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat must be serious in the sense 
that it must be grounded on the objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense 
that the threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible”. 
 
The courts reasoning suggest that not every threat would be regarded as a threat to national 
security. The threat needs to be serious, the suspicion objectively reasonable, based on 
evidence and the harm or risk substantial. The activities of the refugee and their likely 
impact on the host state or its citizens would be the determinant of whether the refugee 
poses a threat to national security or not. Hathaway108 has proposed the following test; 
 
“...a refugee poses a risk to the host state‘s national security if his or her presence or actions give rise 
to an objectively reasonable, real possibility of directly or indirectly inflicted substantial harm to the 
host state’s most basic interests, including the risk of an armed attack on its territory or its citizens, 
or destruction of its democratic institutions.” 
 
From this formulation the following are the key requirements; 
(a) refugees subversive activities or 
(b) presence, 
(c) objectively reasonable or possibility of direct or indirect inflicted 
substantial harm, 
(d) host states most basic interests. 
                                                 
107 [2002] 1SCR 3(Can. SC, Jan.11,2002) 
108Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, p.266  
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If these are met a state may be justified to determine a refugee as a threat to national 
security. Though the formulation was derived from discussion of threats to national 
security posed by a particular refugee provided for in art.9 of CSR 51, the same me equally 
apply to a determination of threats posed by a group of refugees. The phrase ‘consideration 
of national security” covers the same concerns as threat to “national security”.109 Therefore 
the general formulation will be applied in the discussion of the legality of the restrictions 
implemented by Malawi.  
Though the determination of whether a particular situation threatens national security or 
not is in the discretion of the state, the discussion aims at undertaking an objective 
assessment of whether the measures undertaken pursuant to the reservation to art.26 
can/could reasonably and objectively be justified on the requirement of national security.  
 
 The discussion will undertake the objective assessment based on available country reports 
from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S Department of State Country 
Reports on Human Rights, Amnesty International Reports and those from other reputable 
institutions from 1993 to 2007.110    
                                                 
109 The justification for closing Luwani Refugee camp was the threat to national security by refugee and not 
consideration of national security. See note 8 above. 
110 The following country reports have been used for establishing country situation within Malawi from 1993 
to 2006, Amnesty International Report -Malawi  (From 1994-2006) (online)Amnesty 
Internationaleport,web.amnesty.org/web/ar1994.nsf/webafrcountries/MALAWI? , Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices  Malawi- (from  1994 to 2006) (online) U.S. Department of State Human Rights 
Reports,www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.htm,World Refugee Survey 2001-Malawi (March 
2001) (online) U.S Committee for Refugees , www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.htm  
 
World Refugee Survey 2003-Malawi (June 2003) (online) U.S Committee for Refugees, www.unhcr.org/cgi-
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5.1.2.1 Subversive Activities 
Subversive activities include activities like, spying against country of residence, directed to 
wards overthrowing by force or other illegal means the host country government, or any 
activities directed against a foreign government, which as a result threatens the government 
of the country of residence with intervention111. It is submitted that the threat posed by the 
activities in order to justify the measures imposed on all refugees should not be only those 
of individuals but rather of a representative number. 
According to the U.S Department of State Country report of 1994, at the beginning of 
1994, 700,000 Mozambicans remained in Malawi, down from a peak in excess of 1 
million. The Government initially hesitated to take on the responsibility of a new refugee 
population, in part due to popular resentment that UNHCR support allowed refugees a 
lifestyle unattainable to many Malawians. Subsequently, the Government initiated plans to 
relocate the new refugees to a camp, converting a former prison for this purpose.112
The 1995 report records the remaining refugee population consists of approximately 900 
"urban refugees" from Somalia, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. Responding to local 
resentment over the presence of these refugees, the Government decided to establish a 
single refugee center with the support of UNHCR funding. In February these urban 
refugees rioted when the Government phased out cash payments and required refugees to 
live at its designated refugee center.113
The Malawi Government Official website only reports that the Government of Malawi 
adopts an encampment policy for all refugees and asylum seekers. There are two camps 
namely; Dzaleka and Luwani in Dowa and Neno Districts respectively114. The 
justifications or legal basis of the policy is not mentioned. 
                                                 
111 See note 108 above 
112 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.htm 
113 http://www.unhcr.org 
114http://www.malawi.gov.mw/Povelty/Home%20Povelty.htmhttp://www.malawi.gov.mw/Povelty/Home%2
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Based on the reports the initial decision to designate the places of residence of refugees 
was not premised on the requirement of considerations of national security due to 
subversive activities perpetrated by refugees. The remaining issue is whether the continued 
enforcement of the measures can be justified in national security based on subversive 
refugee activities. 
The reports from 1994 to 2006 disclose few incidents of alleged subversive activities of 
refugees. UNHCR News 115 reports of Eritrean asylum seekers who arrived in Malawi 
from Ethiopia on 14 August, 1999, were detained on allegations that they entered illegally 
using fake visas. They were detained at a detention center. Alerted to their imminent 
deportation they staged a protest on August 20 during which one of them was killed and 
several others reportedly wounded, were subsequently deported.116In this case the asylum 
seekers were detained on allegations of using fake visas and not on the basis of their 
subversive activities posing a threat to national security.  
In November 2005 the government revoked the refugee status of 15 refugees, claiming they 
had written a letter threatening the lives of the president and the refugee commissioner, a 
claim that police investigators had determined to be unfounded in 2003. They were 
detained and deported them to the Mozambican border. They returned, obtained a High 
Court order restraining the government from deporting them and granting them the right to 
apply for judicial review of the refugee committee's decision to revoke their refugee status. 
Fearing for their safety, the group went into hiding and later stayed in a UNHCR safe 
house in Mangochi.117
On April 22, 2006 security forces raided the UNHCR safe house in Mangochi, and forcibly 
deported them for a second time to the Mozambican border. Mozambican authorities 
denied the refugees entry and returned them to the Mangochi police station, where police 
rearrested and held them at Maula Prison. The government denied a UNHCR request to 
                                                 
115 115 http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/3ae6b8211c.html 
 
116 http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/3ae6b8211c.html 
117 Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 - Malawi  ( 2007) U.S. Department of State 
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transfer the group to a safe house, claiming they posed a threat to national security. The 
men remained in prison until resettlement to Sweden.118
The report does not indicate that the 15 refugee intended to overthrow the government or 
were engaged in spying against Malawi or were engaged in activities against foreign 
governments or how they were a threat to its citizens. 
On 11 May 2007119Government decided to close one of the refugee camps (Luwani 
Refugee Camp) and relocate the refugees to Dzaleka. The responsible Minister at a press 
briefing said the decision was because some refugees were a security threat to the Country. 
Example were cited of 46 Ethiopian who were intercepted at Mwanza border as they tried 
to cross into Mozambique and 64 other Ethiopians that were intercepted in May at Zobue 
border post hidden inside a fuel tanker destined for South Africa.  
The cited examples show incidents of trafficking or smuggling of asylum seekers. The 
persons seem to use Malawi as a transit country. It was not clear from the reports how they 
posed the threat a threat to Malawi’s security. The decision does not appear to have been 
based on the fear that the asylum seekers intended to overthrow the government or spying 
against Malawi or were engaged in activities against foreign governments or were a threat 
to citizens. 
It may not be necessary for the refugees to actually engage in the activities, it would suffice 
that the activities raise an objectively reasonable or real possibility of directly or indirectly 
inflicted substantial harm which is based on objective evidence. A part from these instances 
the reports do not report of refugee activities that were regarded as subversive in the sense 
of activities directed at the overthrow by force or other illegal means of the government or 
in activities which are directed against a foreign government including the countries of 
origin, which as a result threatened the government of Malawi with intervention of a 
serious nature.  
                                                 
118 Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 - Malawi  ( 2007) U.S. Department of State 
119 http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/4656be2511.html , also reported in the Malawi Daily times Newspaper 
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Therefore from the available reports there was no objective verifiable evidence of 
subversive activities of refugees that amounted to a threat to national security. 
5.1.2.2 Presence 
Threats to national security are not confined to refugee subversive activities, the settlement 
or residence of refugee in any place within the state may also in other cases pose a threat to 
national security.Art.2 (6) of the OAUR 69 requires that refugees be settled at a reasonable 
distance from their frontier of the country of origin. This may be understandable to avoid 
the settlement from being used for launching subversive activities against the country of 
origin and to avoid the possibility of the conflict in the country of origin spiraling into the 
host country through incursions into the refugee settlements by one of the parties to the 
conflict. 
In Malawi the majority of refugees resided at the Dzaleka camp in Mwanza, and a second 
camp in Luwani in Mwanza that opened in October 2003.120   
The refugees hosted in Malawi come from Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, 
Rwanda and Burundi. These countries do not share a common bounder with Malawi. All 
the refugee countries of origin are in the Northern part of Africa further away from the 
camps. This may indicate a less likely hood of their using the camps as a base for launching 
attacks against their country of origin.  
When the Government decided to close Luwani Refugee Camp which was closer to the 
border with Mozambique, it was not based on threats refugees posed to the security of that 
country as the reports do not disclose of any subversive activities launched by refugee 
against that country. 121 It was reported in UNHCR World Country Survey of 2004, that 
Local authorities and press accused refugees from Dzaleka camp of illicit business deals, 
                                                 
120 Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 - Malawi (2005) U.S. Department of State 
121 http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/4656be2511.html 
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taking over Malawian markets, and threatening national security122. The claims have not 
been corroborated or substantiated by other objectively assessable evidence. 
The other reports123 do not record of instances where refugees have used the camps for 
launching attacks against their countries of origin or neighboring countries. There was also 
no indication of whether the presence of refugees has threatened the security of the 
citizens.  
Therefore from the available reports there was no objective verifiable evidence that the 
presence of refugee in any place within Malawi apart from the designated areas, threatened 
the national security or Malawi or neighboring countries. 
5.1.2.3 Risk of substantial harm 
 
The activities or presence of refugees should raise an objectively reasonable or possibility 
or suspicion of direct or indirect inflicted substantial harm. This would depend on the 
activities or presence of the refugees within a country. The suspicion needs to be 
objectively reasonable and based on evidence. For instance it was reported that Local 
authorities and press accused refugees from Dzaleka camp of illicit business deals, taking 
over Malawian markets, and threatening national security124. This may indicate presence of 
suspicion of the refuges as posing a threat to national security. If this would be based on 
evidence it would create an objectively reasonable suspicion. In Karker v France125 the 
refugee was considered a threat to national security on suspicion based objectively 
available evidence that was even presented to the court, that showed him to be an active 
supported of a movement that advocated violent action. The case exemplifies how 
reasonable suspicion should be grounded in objectively assessable evidence. 
 
                                                 
122 World Refugee Survey 2004 Country Report, http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=135 
123 See list in note 113 
124 World Refugee Survey 2004 Country Report, http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=135 
125 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE,(833/98) 
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Another instance would be that of refugees who were suspected of writing a letter 
threatening the life of the president.126 If this was established, then it may have been used 
as a basis for the restriction of the movement of the concerned refugees but not all the 
refugees. 
 
The threatened harm should also be an objectively reasonable or possibility of direct or 
indirect inflicted substantial harm. The suspicion alone is not enough but should be coupled 
with possibility of direct or indirect substantial harm. There should be a possibility that 
harm will occur. Where no such possibility exists the requirement would not be fulfilled. In 
the case of the written letter threatening the life of the president and without any possibility 
of the threat being carried, it may not meet the possibility requirement. 
 
The possibility must be of direct or indirect harm substantial harm and not negligible harm. 
What would amount to substantial harm may vary according to the circumstances of the 
particular case. In the case of the written letter threatening the life of the president plus the 
possibility of it’s being attempted, may be considered a substantial harm as it concerns the 
head of state that is the symbol of the nation. 
 
Therefore from the available reports though some instances of suspicion of refugees were 
reported it is submitted they did not raise an objectively reasonable possibility of direct or 
indirect inflicted substantial harm.  
 
5.1.2.4  Host States most basic interests. 
 
The threat of substantial harm may not enough it should be directed against a basic interest 
of the state. The basic interest include the survival of the state, safety or security of 
citizens, military defenses, maintenance of domestic peace, and maintenance of peaceful 
relations with other states, prevention of destruction of democratic institutions, prevention 
                                                 
126 See note 120 above 
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of armed attack, among others127. The list though not exhaustive may illustrate the class of 
interests that may amount to most basic interest. For this purpose an objectively reasonable 
or real possibility of substantial harm to one or more of the above may qualify as a threat to 
national security. 
 
From the preceding discussion and the available reports it can be observed that there has 
not been a threat of substantial harm directed against the survival of the state of Malawi. 
Refugees have not threatened the military defenses or maintenance of domestic peace. The 
safety or security of Malawi citizens has not been threatened by the movement or free 
choice of residence of refugees. Peaceful relations still subsist with its neighbors and other 
states. Democratic institutions and other constitutional institutions still thrive without any 
threat from the refugees. This although not being an exhaustive consideration of all 
Malawi’s basic interest but still is indicative of the conclusion that presence or activities of 
refugees may not be a threat. 
 
The above discussion generally indicates that the requirements of national security may not 
have justified the imposition or continued maintenance of restrictions on the movement and 
choice of residence of refugees lawfully within Malawi. 
 
5.1.3 Public order    
 
The consideration of public order can justify the designation of places of residence and 
restrictions on freedom of movement of refugees in Malawi under the reservation to 
art.26.The concept of public order recurs in several treaties128and may have different 
meanings. For the purpose of this discussion will consider the meaning in the context of 
Refugee law. Public order appears in art.2 and 32 of the CSR51 and art.1 (2) of the OAU 
Refugee Convention. Art. 32 concerns the expulsion of a refugee lawfully in the territory 
on the ground of national security and public order.     
                                                 
127The Rights of Refugees under International Law, p.266  
128 See art.12(3) ICCPR, art.9(2) ECHR of the 4th APS 
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While national security addresses threats emanating from outside the host country borders, 
public order addresses a general category of concerns focusing on the importance of 
maintaining basic internal security.129 From the CSR51’s travaux preparatoires, public 
order was intended to be a reference to acts prejudicial to the “peace and tranquility of 
society at large”
 
and threats to state authority. 130 Refugees who commit serious crimes or 
obstinately refuse to abide by the laws and who refuse to conform their conduct to the basic 
manners and customs of the host state could be considered to disturb public order131.  
 
In the case of expulsion of a refugee the “common criteria seems to be that public order is 
at stake only in cases where a refugee constitutes a threat to an uncertain number of persons 
carrying out their lawful occupations (habitual criminals, wanton killers), or to society at 
large, as in the case of riots and unrests, or traffic of drugs.132 Public order consideration 
extends beyond criminal activities. This concept clearly excludes poverty, ill health, 
economic and social considerations.  
 
Situations concerning the violations or non respect of fundamental human rights may also 
be a threat to Public order. Rankin133 in analyzing the meaning of public order in art.1 (2) 
of the OAUR69 considers it as a concept that looks to the basic standards governing the 
state in its relation to the community and its individual members. The minimum standard of 
the concept may be characterized by three thresholds namely, non-international armed 
conflict, internal disturbances and tensions and widespread violations of human rights.134
 
From the foregoing discussion three criteria may be used in determining activities or 
situation that disturb public order, namely; 
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132 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, at art. 2, 32. at art. 32, p 130, para. 6. 
133 See note 133 
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(a) activities that threaten a number of persons, 
(b) threats to society at large, 
(c) situations of non respect for human rights, 
 
Criteria (a) and (b) apply in situations of expulsion of individual refugee for disturbing 
public order. The expulsion situations may require a higher threshold of disturbance than 
situations requiring the restrictions of movement and designation of places of residence. 
Though this being the case the two criteria  still may be applicable  in determining whether 
conduct of a refugee or refugee amounts to disturbance of public order necessitating the 
operation of the reservation to art.26 
 
The three criteria will be used in discussing whether the conduct of refugees in Malawi has 
disturbed public order to justify the designation of places of residence and restrictions on 
freedom of internal movement. 
 
5.1.3.1 Threats to Persons 
 
Public order may be disturbed where refugees criminal activities (habitual criminals, 
wanton killers) constitute a threat to an uncertain number of persons carrying out their 
lawful occupations.135 Refugees who commit serious crimes may be considered to disturb 
public order136.  
In Malawi the Penal Code137 in Division 1 on Offences Against Public Order, outlines the 
serious and minor offences whose commission disturbs public order. The provision 
includes, s.38 Treason, s.39 concealment of treason, s.40 promoting war among Africans, 
s.41Inciting to mutiny, s.42, Aiding soldiers or policemen in acts of mutiny among the 
                                                 
135 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2 – 11, 13-37 at art. 2,  32. art. 
32, p 130, para. 6. 
136 Hathaway,p683 
137 Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
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serious crimes. The Code in sections 61 to 62 prescribes for minor offences, those affecting 
relations with foreign states and external tranquility. 
A review of the available reports shows one reported instances of allegations of offences 
committed by refuges. 
 
One of the reports138 recorded that Local authorities and press accused refugees from 
Dzaleka camp of illicit business deals, taking over Malawian markets, and threatening 
national security. Taking over of Malawian markets is not a crime under the penal code not 
to be a crime in Malawi Penal code therefore may not be considered a threat to public 
order. The illicit business deals if of a very serious criminal nature would amount to a 
serious crime and a disturbance of public order. From the reports this was only an 
allegation and not substantiated.  
 
Apart from this instance the reports do not report of other instances of refugees committing 
serious crimes which threatened an uncertain number of persons within Malawi carrying 
out their lawful occupations and resulted in disturbing public order. 
 
5.1.3.2 Threats to the society at large 
  
Threats to society at large, as in the case of riots and unrests, or traffic of drugs139 can also 
amount to disturbances of public order. Therefore if refugees staged riots or other unrest 
while within Malawi which constituted a threat to the society at large, the government 
would be justified in exercising its right to designate places of residence of refugee and 
restrict their freedom of internal movement. 
 
 The duration of the measures would have to proportional with the public order 
requirement, when the necessity ends the measures would also have to cease. The measures 
                                                 
138 World Refugee Survey 2004 Country Report, http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=135 
139 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2 – 11, 13-37 at art. 32, 130, 
para. 6. 
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would have to only apply to the participating refugees and not to the whole refugee 
population, unless it proved impossible to determine those not involved.  
 
In the case of the Eritrean asylum seekers140 who were detained for entering using fake 
visas. They staged a protest at the detention center after being alerted of their imminent 
deportation, resulting in the death of one of them and several others reportedly wounded. If 
these were not already detained, restrictions on their movement and choice of residence 
would have been justified if the staged protest constituted a threat to society at large. The 
measures would have been in force for as long as they were required. These would have 
only applied to the protesting refugees and not to all. 
 
The reports do not record of other instances of riots or unrest involving refugees that 
threatened society at large and disturbed public order. 
 
5.1.3.3 Non respect for human rights 
 
The concept of public order has also been used to characterize the basic standards 
governing the state in its relation to the community and its individual members. This may 
be characterized by non-international armed conflict, internal disturbances and tensions and 
widespread violations of human rights.141This characterization stems from a consideration 
of situations seriously disturbing public order which may compel a person to leave his 
place of habitual residence and seek refugee outside his country as provided for in art.1(2) 
of the OAUR69.  
 
This context concerns situations of the break down of the public order of the state 
generally. The existence of such a situation may be sufficient to compel person to leave and 
seek asylum or even compel a state to take extraordinary emergency measures to restore or 
maintain public order. It is submitted that the existence of such a situation may justify the 
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imposition of proportional restrictive measures on freedom of movement and choice of 
residence of refugee in Malawi on the considerations of public order under the reservation 
to art.26. 
 
5.1.3.3.1 Non-international armed conflict 
 
Non-international armed conflict is a situation where peace and tranquility no longer exists, 
exclusive control of territory is lost, and society at large is threatened. 142 The reports show 
that since the time of the introduction of the encampment policy, even before then, Malawi 
has not experienced non-international armed conflict where peace and tranquility no longer 
existed, exclusive control of territory was lost, and society at large was threatened. 
 
5.1.3.3.2 Internal disturbances and tensions 
 
Internal disturbances and tensions are situations of some seriousness and duration which 
are a threat to the state authority or to indeterminate numbers of people. Disturbances are 
said to occur when “the state uses armed force to maintain order”
 
whereas internal tensions 
occur when “force is used as a preventive measure to maintain respect for law.”143 These 
may include riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature144.  
 
These situations have happened in Malawi during the transition period from a one party 
state to a multiparty state.145The report Malawi: Between the Referendum and the Elections 
reports of the situation when mid-ranking and junior army offices mutinied and attacked 
bases of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) after the government failed to honor the 
undertaking to disarm them. The army intervened and forcibly disarmed the MYP. The 
                                                 
142 Rankin, based the interpretation on Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional 
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army attacked the Ministry of Youth and other MYP installations in Lilongwe. The army 
then moved into MYP bases throughout the country. At least 30 people appear to have died 
in the operation. 
Riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature appear to 
have happened during this period. These situations though seem not to have recurred with 
the same severity since then. If the situation had been protracted the Government would 
have been acted within its rights under the reservation to art.26, if it had taken measures to 
restrict refugee residence and movement in consideration of public order. The report shows 
that this was the period of the repatriation of Mozambican refugees before the imposition 
of the encampment measures. 
 
The reports do not record of other such instances involving the internal disturbances and 
tensions.  
 
5.1.3.3.3 Widespread violation of the human rights 
 
The third threshold of is the widespread violation of the human rights. Not each and every 
violation of human rights that would amount to disturbing public order but only serious 
violations to fundamental human rights that cause a substantial disruption to the 
community as a whole and to the basic principles that ought to govern relationships within 
a given community. To seriously disturb public order should be seen as event-type 
involving violence or threats against an indeterminate number of people or to society at 
large. 146Fundamental human rights concerns those core set of human rights from which no 
derogation is permitted, 147a violation of these on a sufficiently broad scale may be an 
indication that public order has been disturbed. 
                                                 
146 Rankin, ibid 
147Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights decision 2001/112. 
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It would be difficulty to imagine a situation perpetrated by refugees in a host country that 
would fit or attain this standard. From available country reports Malawi does not seem to 
have experienced events perpetrated by refugees involving violence or threats against 
fundamental human rights of an indeterminate number of people or to society at large on a 
sufficiently broad scale to be an indication that public order had been disturbed to justify 
restrictions on movement and choice of residence of refugees. 
 
Other concerns such as basic affronts to public morality or social norms of the asylum 
country could be deemed grounds for public order restrictions only in truly grave cases148. 
In Malawi only in very grave cases would public order restrictions on the movement and 
choice of residence of refugees be justified on the basis of their being an affront to public 
morality or social norms. These may not be borne out by any objectively verifiable 
evidence in the available reports.
 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
The discussion has shown that the restrictive measures on freedom of internal movement 
and choice of residence of refuges in Malawi can not be supported on the consideration or 
requirements of national security or public order. Therefore the measures do not fulfill the 
condition precedent for their imposition in accordance with the reservation to article 26 of 
CSR51. Therefore the measures are inconsistent with art. 26 as modified by the reservation. 
The inconsistency lenders the measures unlawful in international law. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
148 Hathaway, p 686 
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 6 Legal Consequences Of The Measures 
 
The discussion will focus on legal consequences for Malawi resulting from the unlawful 
measures restricting freedom of internal movement and choice of residence of refugees in 
relation to other state parties and the refugees.The discusion will also focus on the 
enforment measures available to the state parties and refugees. 
 
6.1 Between Malawi and other state parties 
 
Malawi as a state party to CSR51 has entered into legal relationship with the other state 
parties involving rights and obligations. It is bound149 by the provisions of the convention 
from the date of its accession and has a good faith obligation150 to implement and comply 
with the provisions.  
 
Failure to fulfill the obligation may result in the responsibility of the state being engaged, 
from which a number of legal consequences will flow151. In this context state responsibility 
designates the legal consequences of an international wrongful act of a state, namely the 
obligations of the wrongdoer, on one hand and the rights and powers of any state affected 
by the wrong on the other hand.152 For a wrongful act to occur it is necessary for conduct 
consisting of an action or omission attributable to the state under international law and 
which constitutes a breach of an international obligation (or international law153) of the 
state154.There should also not exist circumstances precluding wrongfulness155. 
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In this discussion the focus will be on the consequences of the measures restricting freedom 
of movement and choice of residence in the light of their unlawfulness. The reservation 
being lawful would not amount to an international wrongful act hence no consequences 
would flow from it. 
 
6.1.1 Consequences of the measures 
 
Under the provision of art.26 as modified by the reservation Malawi has an obligation to 
accord refugees lawfully within its territory the right to choose their place of residence and 
to move freely within its territory subject to regulations applicable to aliens generally, 
except where considerations of national security and public order so require.  
 
The discussion in chapter 5 has shown that the restrictive measures on freedom of internal 
movement and choice of residence of refuges in Malawi are unlawful156. As a consequence 
of the imposition and continued maintenance of the measures Malawi is in violation of the 
under art.26. 
 
The violation of the international obligation amounts into a breach of international law 
which constitutes an international wrongful act.157The ICJ in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project ( Hungary/Slovakia) stated; 
 
“when  a state has committed an internationally wrongful act, its international responsibility is likely 
to be involved whatever the nature of the obligation it has failed to respect.”158
 
From discussion in chapter 5 there exist no circumstances precluding wrongfulness.159 
Therefore Malawi’s responsibility will be engaged as a consequence of the breach.  
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Following this the other state parties can invoke the responsibility of Malawi for the 
wrongful act. Treaty obligations are owed to all the other States parties. Under art. 48 (1) of 
the ILC Draft Articles any state other than an injured state is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another if the obligation is owed to a group of states including that state, 
and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group. 
 
 The example of such group interest could be the obligations to protect human rights 
norms160, which refugee rights are part of. Therefore any state party can intervene (without 
the necessity of showing that it has been injured) and request cessation of the restrictive 
measures, assurances and guarantees of non repetition under art.48 (2). The other states can 
the means provided in art.33 (1) of the UN Charter namely negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or peaceful means to 
achieve cessation of the breach. 
 
Failure to settle the matter by other means it can be referred to the ICJ under art.38.of the 
Convention. Under art.38 any disputes between states parties relating to the interpretation 
or application which can not be settled by other means shall be referred top the ICJ. In the 
present discussion the matter appear to relate to the application of the convention and not to 
its interpretation therefore within the mandate of the court. 
 
6.2 Malawi and Refugees 
 
The discussion will consider the consequences in international law of the measures under 
the CSR51 first then under general Human Rights law.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 Evans, see note 165, p.474 
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6.2.1 Under the CSR51  
 
For implications to flow there should be first an obligation that Malawi owes to refugees in 
international law under the convention, that obligation should have been breached by 
Malawi and no circumstances precluding wrongfulness should exist.  
 
6.2.1.1 Existence Obligation 
 
The CSR51 remains a treaty between States, as such, treaty obligations are primarily owed 
to the parties and not the individual beneficiaries. This stems from the fact that traditionally 
individuals were not considered subjects of international law161. This was pointed out by 
the PCJ in Danzing Railway Officials162 case; 
 
“According to a well-established principle of international law, [a treaty between Poland and 
Germany] being an international agreement, cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for 
private individuals. But it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, 
according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption by the parties of some 
definite rules creating individual rights and obligations enforceable by the national courts.” 
 
Modern practice indicates that individuals have become increasingly recognized as subjects 
(not as mere beneficiaries) of international law, 163with obligations and corresponding 
rights. The extent of the rights and obligations still depend on the intention of the 
Parties164.  
 
From the preamble, the specific rights165 and duties166 in CSR51 it cannot be disputed that 
the very object of the Convention, according to the intention of the contracting parties, was 
the adoption of some definite rules creating individual refugees rights and obligations. A 
                                                 
161 Shaw, International Law,pp.182, O’Connell, International Law,pp.106-7 
162 PCJ, Series B, No.15 (1928); 4ILR,pp.287 
163 Shaw,pp.183, Cassese, pp. 144-50 
164 Shaw,pp.184 
165 Art.12,13,14,15,16,26 
166 Art.2 
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reading of the Convention shows that apart from the obligations owed to other parties a 
state also owes obligations directly to individual refugees who are the beneficiaries167. 
Walter Kälin,168 observed that; 
 
“It should be noted that the Refuge Convention remains a treaty between States. As such, treaty 
obligations are not only owed to those individuals entitled by its guarantees, but at the same time to 
the other States parties.” 
 
It is submitted that the CSR51 also creates some binding obligations owed to refugees. 
Malawi therefore owes some obligation in international law to the refugees. The obligation 
extends not to all rights provided for under the convention, but those which are guaranteed 
by provisions that Malawi consented to be bound by.     
 
In terms of art.26 Malawi has an obligation to accord refugees lawfully within its territory 
the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory subject to 
regulations applicable to aliens generally. This obligation is owed only to refugees lawfully 
within Malawi and may be limited whenever considerations of national security and public 
order require.  
  
6.2.1.2    Breach and Consequences 
 
The unlawfulness of the measures restricting choice of residence and freedom of movement 
of refugees in Malawi necessarily also implies a violation of the obligations owed to 
refugees. The violation implies a breach by Malawi of the international obligations under 
art.26 of CSR51. 
 
The breach of international law has attendant consequences that flow from it169. Whether 
refugees as holders of rights provided by art.26, can under the Convention invoke the 
                                                 
167 Art.14,29,32,33, 
168  (2001)Supervising the 1951Convention on the Status of Refugees: article 35 and beyond, (online) 
UNHCR , www.unhcr.org 
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responsibility of Malawi, seek cessation of the wrongful policy and redress for the breach 
will depend on whether the convention also endows them with procedural rights.  
 
Under the CSR 51 states appear to have only granted refugees substantive rights and not 
procedural rights170. Therefore refugees do not possess procedural rights to petition 
international bodies to enforce compliance with the treaty obligations171. This may be 
contrasted with states parties that have procedural rights under art.38. 
 
The absence in CSR51of procedural rights for petition international bodies to enforce 
compliance with the treaty obligations at international level is a serious blow to the 
protection of refugee rights guaranteed under the convention. 
 
6.3 Human Rights Consequences 
 
Refugee rights are fundamentally human rights.172 The rights in the Human Rights treaties 
are complimentary173 to those in the Refugee Convention, therefore readily applicable and 
relevant to the protection of rights of refugees. From the discussion in chapter three it was 
observed that the rights in art.26 of the Convention are also guaranteed for every person in 
other human rights conventions.  
 
These rights are available to every person within the territory of a state party174and extend 
to refugees within a territory of a state party independent of the CSR5. Malawi being a 
party to these conventions without reservations to the articles providing the freedom of 
movement and residence has a binding legal obligation to guarantee the rights to refugees 
                                                                                                                                                    
169 See note 156 
170 See Cassese, pp.146-50 for discussion of individual substantive and procedural rights 
171 Refugees have procedural rights at national level under ss.41 (1) on the right to access to any court, 
tribunal with jurisdiction for final settlement of legal issues, s.41 (2) right to an effective remedy by a court of 
law for acts violating the rights and freedoms granted by the Constitution.  
 
172 Gorlick, Brian, Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International Human Rights 
Law, Nordic Journal Of International Law 69:117-177,2000 
173 Gorlick,pp171 
174 Malawi is a party to both conventions 
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in its territory without discrimination175. Failure to fully perform the obligation may lead to 
consequences. 
 
 The measures and encampment policy form the discussion above may also violate the 
rights under these conventions176 the refugees may after exhausting local remedies have an 
avenue to lodge a complaint in international law. 
 
6.3.1 Under The ICCPR Mechanism 
 
Under the ICCPR regime, states have an obligation to respect and ensure that all 
individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction enjoy the rights provided 
by the Covenant177. Malawi as a state party has an obligation under art.12(1) to ensure that 
all person , including refugees lawfuly within its territory have the liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose residence.For those that are also parties (Malawi is one of them) to the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, individuals 
within their territory can lodge complaints to the Human Rights Committee.178 Under art.2 
an individual who claim a violation of rights under the ICCPR after exhausting local 
remedies179 can submit a written communication for consideration180.The Committee, will 
then examine if a state party has violated this individual’s human rights, as laid down in the 
ICCPR. The procedure, although written and confidential, can be compared to court 
proceedings. The Committee’s decision, which is called a ‘View’, is not ‘directly’legally 
binding. States have, however, accepted the Committee’s competence to interpret the 
ICCPR181. If the Committee finds a human rights violation, states parties have an 
                                                 
175 Gorlick,, pp171 
176 The measures appear not to fulfill the limitation in ICCPR Art.12(3) and ACHPR at.12 (2) 
177 Art.2 
178 Art.1 of the Protocol, 
179 Art.5 (2) (b) 
180 Brian Gorlick, Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International Human Rights 
Law, Nordic Journal Of International Law 69: pp174-175 
181 Persuad, Santhash, p3 
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obligation to repair this violation, under the provisions of the ICCPR, which are in turn 
legally binding.182
 
Therefore a refugee can after exhausting the local remedies183, use this mechanism by 
submitting a written communication alleging a violation of the rights in art.12 (1) of the 
ICCPR by Malawi through the restrictions on the movement and residence. The Human 
Rights Committee would have to notify Malawi184. It will after examining the 
communication notify its views to Malawi and the refugees. If the Committee finds a 
human rights violation, Malawi would have an obligation to repair the violation. 
 
Though this procedure is available it should be noted that very few communications have 
been submitted by asylum-seekers or refugees, and even fewer have been found admissible 
by the Committee.185A significant number of states unfortunately refuse to comply with the 
Committee’s Views despite the fact that Views are made public and thus create a certain 
pressure. They either do not respond to the Committee’s request for information on the 
implementation of the View, reiterate that the Committee made a wrong decision or simply 
refuse to take appropriate measures. 186
 
Irrespective of the shortfalls the mechanism can be utilized to enforce the compliance by 
Malawi of its obligation to refugees. 
 
6.3.2 ACHPR Mechanism 
 
The African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights in art.12 (1) guarantee’s the freedom of 
movement and residence. The Charter in art.1 places an obligation on state parties to adopt 
                                                 
182 McGoldrick, Dominic, The Human Rights Committee: its Role in the Development of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999; 151 
183 Through Judicial Review in the High Court in Malawi. For discussion of the procedures see Bradley and 
King, Constitutional and Administrative Law ,Pearson, Longman,2003 
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185 Persuad, Santhash, p3 
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legislative and other means to give effect to rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in it. 
This is an obligation to ensure effective enjoyment of the rights by the individuals without 
distinction. 
 
The charter provides mechanisms for the enforcement of the rights or ensuring compliance 
with Charter obligations by states through the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights established in art.30.The Commission can consider state party187 and individual 
complaints188 concerning violations of the provisions of the Charter. The objective of the 
individual complaints mechanism is to initiate a positive dialogue, resulting in an amicable 
resolution between the complainant and the state concerned, which remedies the prejudice 
complained of.189  
 
The refugees having fulfilled the requirements in art.56 can submit a communication to the 
Commission alleging violation of the rights in art.12 (1) by Malawi through its restrictive 
measures on movement and the encampment policy. The Commission would notify 
Malawi and if the measures continue it will in accordance with it procedures issues a 
decision. The only draw back is that the decision is not binding and its enforcement 
depends on the good will of the concerned state party, in this case Malawi. 
 
The above are some of the legal consequences that may flow from the unlawful policy by 
Malawi restricting the movement and choice of residence of refugees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 Art.43 
188Art. 55, Though it’s disputed whether this provision is the legal basis for individual complaints. See Steiner 
and Alston, International Human Rights in Context, (Oxford University Press,2000),pp.920-24   
189 In the Free Legal Assistance Group Case, 1996 
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7 Conclusion  
       
“Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience” 
Edward, W . 
 
“Refugees are for the most part victims of human rights abuses. And more often than not, 
the great majority of today’s refugees are likely to suffer double violation: the violation in 
their own country of origin which will usually underlie the flight to another country; and 
the denial of a full guarantee of their fundamental rights and freedoms in the receiving 
state.”190  
 
The above quotation rightly puts in perspective the observation and conclusion of the 
thesis. The thesis set out to discuss the legality in international law of the reservations made 
by Malawi to CSR51 and the measures restricting the movement and choice of residence of 
refugees. Freedom of movement and choice of residence is one of the key rights for 
refugees without which the enjoyment of the other rights will be greatly constrained. 
 
The consequences of the breach under the CSR51 for Malawi in relation to the other state 
parties differ from those of refugees. While the other state parties have an avenue for 
seeking cessation of the wrongful act and ensuring compliance the refugees do not have 
such procedural rights. This difference though justified by the fact that only states are 
parties to the convention and only them can decide what rights refugees can benefit from 
the convention, leaves the beneficiary of the rights and the individual the protection of 
whose rights the convention seeks to protect without and effective mechanism of enforcing 
compliance in cases of violations. This may further be compounded by the fact that states 
                                                 
190 Maluwa, Tiyanjana, 
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are general unlikely for political considerations to condemn other states for failure to fulfill 
the treaty obligations unless their interests or that of their nationals are affected. 
 
Refugees are only left with a complimentary enforcement mechanism through the Human 
rights treaty bodies whose decisions as shown in the preceding chapter lack effectiveness 
as they rely on the goodwill of the concerned states for their implementation. The lack of 
an effective enforcement mechanism for the rights of refugees was a great omission and a 
flaw of the international refugee law. 
 
It should be concede that a full assessment of the legality of the measures and effect on the 
enjoyment of rights by refugees was impeded by absence of a written Refugee Policy in 
Malawi and the absence of official documentation explaining the reasons or justifications 
for the encampment policy. In the absence, the thesis only based its discussion and 
conclusions secondary sources, through country reports. Despite this limitation the 
conclusion drawn are still valid. 
  
It should be pointed out that the conclusion of the thesis does not imply that Malawi does 
not have a right to restrict the movement and choice of residence of refugees. The thesis 
only demonstrates that according to the wording of the reservation to art.26 such restriction 
can only be made in if the specified preconditions exist. Failure to meet the requirements 
would lender any restrictions unlawful. It is from this premise that the thesis concludes that 
after an objective analysis the measures restricting the movement of refugees and choice of 
residence of refugees in Malawi do not meet the specified requirements hence unlawful 
under international law.     
 
“The Lord also will be a refuge for the oppressed, a refugee in times of trouble.” 
   Psalms 10:9 
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